Matt Taibbi and Mike Benz — March 2, 2023 Twitter Space Transcript

A verbatim transcript of a live audio conversation where Mike Benz connects with Matt Taibbi — laid out for reading.

By Renee DiResta · Published August 4, 2026

Primary document
Primary document — audio transcript
Transcript
Host Matt Taibbi Mike Benz Questioner (audience)

00:00Taibbi joins: where did the censorship apparatus come from?

Host

00:00:00 Or something like that Holy cow. Matt looks like he joined us, so that's gonna be awesome. Hey, Matt. Good to see you. We're just going through your work- Oh, hi.

Matt Taibbi

Uh, thanks for having me on.

Host

Absolutely, Matt. So this, uh, so this is what I was saying. Um, a lot of the stuff that, the stuff that you guys have come out with, I'm glad I get to make this comment to you directly.

So one of the more damning stuff was the internal comms, uh, initially around the censoring within Twitter. Um, I thought that was fascinating. Also, the January 6th and the Trump stuff was really fascinating. Um, but this one to me, th- this... Because I've been going after so hardcore, like, the office of director of national intelligence, the think tanks.

Where was the overall platform of censorship apparatus actually coming from? 'Cause I felt like the FBI was just small potatoes compared to, like, what Bill Evanina is doing, what, uh, a lot of these people are doing, and this one right here explains a lot of my questions. 00:01:00 So real quick, Matt, um, I was watching your video.

You, you and, um, oh, what was his name? There was four of you. You guys were having a debate. There was two and two. And basically one of the opposing views to you was that everything that you guys were talking about was all coordinated, it was all talking points, and you need to get your narrative together, and you were kind of pushing back.

And so I was wondering where all of these talking points that were coming out on all these various different journalist, quote unquote, outlets were coming from. And the joke was always that everybody was talking in the background saying, "Okay, this is what we're gonna put out today." But from what I can see here between Hamilton 68 and the GEC, the talking points were coming from there.

Is that what, is that what you, essentially what you're saying here?

02:00The 'disinformation machinery': a network of dozens of groups

Matt Taibbi

Well, I, I think the, the larger answer to what you're, you're saying, you- you're asking the right question, which is, you know, the FBI seems like small potatoes. They're obviously not gonna have enough personnel to have a massive impact on, um, you know, the Twitter 00:02:00 discourse.

But collectively, kind of the entire disinformation machinery does, and that's this huge network of groups, um, that, uh, include both actual government agencies like GEC, um, and groups that, that are funded, uh, by the government, like the Digital Forensic Research Lab, uh, the Information Access Fund, uh, DisinfoCloud.

I mean, we're, we're... That's what we're trying to do is we're trying to identify how many of those there are. But, uh, as you can see from this one, there were at least 39 at the start of this. Um, and I think it's probably significantly more now

Host

Yeah, and it's really concerning. And what... I liked how you actually broke down what the GEC is, right?

Because it's, it's an inter-agency group, so it's not just, like, one group. The reason they have these resources and the ability to do this is because it is an inter-agency operating amongst through 00:03:00 all these groups, and they just have people that are contracting to the GECs, essentially what I'm reading here.

I just went through your email where you had reached out to, um, oh, what was it? Who was it? JM-

Matt Taibbi

Burger, yeah. JM, yeah.

03:00Hamilton 68, the JM Berger email, and the GEC

Host

Yeah. And I find this screenshot to be fascinating. I pointed out this is something that people are gonna wanna hang on to, um, because when they try to discredit when you're talking about this, that email confirms a lot of what, what's going on in here just, just by him denying it, if that makes sense.

Matt Taibbi

Well, he's, he's, uh, admitting that he was on the payroll of this organization, which doesn't necessarily mean that he was working on Hamilton68 for, um, for GEC. But you know, it, it, it is interesting. It's a fact that wasn't disclosed. Um, if you read any of the, the multitudinous news stories about Hamilton68 that were so worshipful when that was...

when that first came out. You didn't see anybody say, "This, this board was designed by one person from GEC and a couple 00:04:00 of other people from the NSA," and, um, because it was. Uh, so, um- ... you know, I, I just think those things are things that the public needs to know. Uh, and that should be part of everybody's reporting when we're talking about, um, sort of disinformation experts.

Uh, yes, there is... They might be associated with a university, but what else are they, you know? We, we need to know that.

Host

Right. And it, and it is this transparency that... And it's, this is why a lot of us, like, feel crazy. I haven't got a chance to look through that list to see if I was on it yet. But, but I'm going to for sure.

Yeah, there's- Because- ... there's a lot of...

Matt Taibbi

Well, there's a lot of strange names in that list, but yeah

Host

Yeah. I imagine that probably was one of my seven accounts that were banned before. But, uh, I imagine I'll get there, but... So, like, so, uh, so looking at this GEC and you had kind of thrown a mention to the Atlantic Council, um, I, I'm, I'm just wondering if this is 00:05:00 actually working in, in tangent with like...

'Cause it, it did s- I think I did see the cybersecurity agency was involved. So they are working with CISA as well?

05:00The GEC, DHS, and CISA

Matt Taibbi

Well, I don't, I mean, it, it, DHS is in there. I think this might have predated CISA, um, w- when, when GEC started. I'm not sure of the, of the timeline, uh, on that. But, um, but DHS was obviously one of the original partners of, of GEC.

And there were, there were a lot of agencies that were, that were there at the start of this, and it was a pretty small operation to begin with. And, uh, uh, they were trying to tackle a very specific problem, and they didn't have a lot of money to deal with it initially. They were, they were really trying to come up with propaganda, uh, solutions for ISIS recruitment.

And it wasn't until after Trump got elected that they moved to this new mission about disinformation, and that's, that's when suddenly 00:06:00 they, you know, they, they staffed up, they got a lot of money. Um, but they, they really weren't, they weren't formed to deal with that initially. That wasn't their original mission.

Host

Ye- yeah, and I, I pointed that out 'cause like when I started this space map, we actually read your Substack, um, on the space before we got to the file so we could be prepped- Hmm ... to kind of understand. Uh, a friend of mine, uh, brought in Kieran, who's actually, uh, in India, and he was gonna talk about the Hindu Nationalist aspect, which I think is just, just incredible.

I did not know about that.

Matt Taibbi

So. Yeah, I'd, I'd love to hear about that. I mean, I, I'd be curious to hear the, the reactions from somebody, uh, about that list. I mean, I, I don't really understand why the government would be in the business of, of trying to tell Twitter not to, um, have Hindu Nationalists on, on their site.

I mean, that's not to say that I endorse that one way 00:07:00 or the other. It's just, it- is that a thing? I mean, is that a thing that we do? I, I don't really understand that

Host

Yeah, I don't either. And I'm gonna get Kieran in here in a second. Uh, Hannah, if he, if he's not listening, I'm gonna get him in here to, to respond to that, 'cause I, I'd like to hear it as well.

That's why I brought him in. Uh, but Dust has his hand up, so go ahead, Dust.

07:00A questioner on January 6 and 'degrees of separation'

Questioner

Hey, Matt, and, uh, thank you for joining us, and thank you for doing this. No, thank you. Uh, we, we, we, we see in the files, like, kind of a tepid resistance from Twitter employees, like pushing back, and you, you, you make sure to highlight, um, that they at least went and checked.

I, I, I'm just curious as you've gone through all of this, um, whether you get the sense that Google and Facebook and some of the other, like, big tech, I call them oligarchs, um, w- they, they didn't even have that level of, like, tepid resistance.

Matt Taibbi

Well, I think, uh, yeah, first of all, it's a good question. Um, 00:08:00 I don't know for sure, but from the limited interactions, uh, that I've seen with the other platforms, and they do have them in the Twitter Files, uh, because they have these, uh, regular industry meetings with the government, so you see some of the crosstalk back and forth.

But my understanding is that, um, Google and Facebook are, are both much more hardcore about these issues than Twitter is. Twitter had a culture of this sort of free speech protection. Its CEO during this entire period, you know, nominally was Jack Dorsey. Now, he was kind of absent, um, in a lot of ways. Uh, w- somebody described him to me as being more like the company's spirit animal than its CEO.

Um, but within, within Twitter, there was, there was at least a little bit of, um, concern about free speech values. I mean, not a lot, but there was a little 00:09:00 bit of it. I- you see that lessening over time. Um, I think, I think after 2017 when they had this collision with, uh, the Congress over the Russian interference issue, um, they realized that they had to kind of change their tune, and you can see the, the attitude change is pretty pronounced after that, so.

And then also there's this flood of former national security officials who, who are staffing up the place, um, which is also conspicuous

Questioner

Very much so. And I kind of pointed out as you kind of sh- either intentionally or unintentionally shown in a lot of these Twitter files where there was a mark, marked change of pushback.

Like once, I don't know, once either January 6 or Trump 2020, the TDS kind of pushed them to even just be like, "Nope, we're going, we're going full bore now." Um, that change was interesting to me.

Matt Taibbi

Yeah. A- a- 00:10:00 after, after January, uh, 6, you can see, and when... That, that was one of the reasons why we thought it was important to document, you know, what was going on in Slack during those days.

Because, um, you know, they, they made a very, uh, uh, important decision to go from being a, a really a rules-based content moderation system, uh, to being an, an arbitrary one. They, they essentially for Donald Trump specifically created a new way of dealing with high-profile accounts that, um, that sort of e- eliminated the rules and allow- allowed them to look at what they called the, uh, the context surrounding.

That was the quote. Uh, so you, you ha- you could look at the, the, a, an account in its entirety, um, y- you know, and consider things as random as who's, who 00:11:00 follows that person, what the followers say, whether or not they're expressing, um, thoughts that would be considered hate speech or violence. Uh, and you can take all that into account even if the person in question isn't actually committing a, um, a violation of the terms of service, and that is ultimately what they decided with Trump because Trump's tweets, even during January 6th, were not violative.

So they, they came around to this new way of thinking, which was a, was a really big change, uh, for, for them. And, uh, and I, and I think that's, that's kind of where a lot of these disinformation, uh, platforms are at right now. They're, they're, they're really much more subjective than they claim to be. Yeah.

Host

And did you get any indication, Matt, of- Mm-hmm ... the amount of degrees of separation they went to be able to link it to or infer that it was part of this Russian campaign? 00:12:00 Like, how many degrees did you, do you think they ended up going? Could you tell?

Matt Taibbi

With J6 or, or with all the stuff?

Host

Just with all the stuff, yeah, in general, especially with what we're talking about today.

13:00Russia as the impetus

Matt Taibbi

Well, so d- you know, R- Russia is the, is, is really important because that was the impetus for all of these government agencies, the FBI, DHS, and especially the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. That, that, they, they were really the leaders in banging down the, the doors of Silicon Valley and telling them that they had to adopt stricter procedures and let the government in, um, because of Russian interference.

So there was this, uh, there was this real emphasis on playing up the degree of threat, uh, with- W- w- with, with Russia. Now, the thing that's amazing, and, you know, you have to think about this in terms of, um, how many news stories 00:13:00 that, that were, are out there that were just never, you know, retracted or addressed.

You had this group that the, that the Senate hired, New Knowledge, um, it, which is a company that was staffed by a couple of ex-NSA people, uh, you know, Jonathan Morgan and Ryan Fox. And they get caught faking a Russian influence campaign in Alabama, yet they're one of the lead authors on the Senate's report on Russian interference.

Um, so you know, and that, and that's why in this thread today I tried to show, like, all, all these headlines that are talking about the scope and sweep of the, of Russia's campaign, and they're authored by, like, known fraudsters. Um-

Mike Benz

Matt, it's worse than that ...

Matt Taibbi

why, why, why haven't we-

Mike Benz

It's worse than that

Matt Taibbi

... gone back and fixed that?

14:00Mike Benz introduces himself

Mike Benz

You know? I don't know. It's... Uh, sorry, I just, uh, just joined here. Um- Uh, I have- Hey, Mike Uh, hey, thanks for, thanks for having me. Matt, uh, 00:14:00 you're, you're, you're now... I've been following from afar. My name is Mike Benz. Um, I'm, uh-

Matt Taibbi

Hello

Mike Benz

... uh, hi, uh, hi. I, uh, run a, a, a non-profit free speech foundation, uh, after previously serving, uh, in the government role watching all this.

I've been, uh, what, what- Oh- ... you're doing on your track is what I've been chronicling for about six, seven years, and I've been hoping to talk to you-

Matt Taibbi

Wow

Mike Benz

... for a long time because I believe I have all of the missing pieces of the puzzle that I've been watching you search for. You've done an amazing job. Really an incredible, potentially history altering job with, with the way that you've put together the, the, what, what you've al- what you already have.

Uh, I have seen you search for certain levels of things that I hope that maybe, uh, if you, if I can sort of upload my brain onto yours and see what you do with it.

Matt Taibbi

Absolutely.

Mike Benz

Uh, so just a little background on myself. So, um, I was the s- I was the cyber DAS at State, meaning the deputy assistant 00:15:00 secretary for international communications and information technology.

It's a long way of saying I ran the big tech portfolio at the State Department in 2020 during that-

Matt Taibbi

Oh, wow

Mike Benz

... d- during that time when all of this fusion between big tech and big government was happening. So I, my desk was, I was the one who would field the calls from Google lobbyists when they would want favors from big government.

And in return, we, the State Department, would cram down on, you know, the European Union or other countries in order to get tech policy more favorable to our US national champions. This is obviously something that we've been doing, you know, since the banana wars with big sugar. You know, this, this sort of big government scratches the back of, of, of big corporations always was done with this sort of social contract in mind that Americans would have, you know, cheaper gas prices or cheaper sugar or, uh...

But what was happening in 2020 is the US government was doing favors 00:16:00 for big corporations, and then those corporations would turn around and censor the people who voted for the government. So, so completely... So I watched this all happen- with total horror and fascination. Uh, I was previously i- in, in the White House before that, and then before that I was a, I was a tech lawyer.

Uh, and I watched this monstrosity of the, of the sort of, you know, what I call the ce- the censorship industry as it was, uh, uh, as it was building. I was actually put into that role because I kept warning the White House this was going to happen. No one on the first floor believed me until it actually did, and then they slotted me into actually, uh, into a policy role to change it.

And I had been actually working on a, a whole, uh, I was halfway through a documentary in 2018 about this whole censorship industry when everything that I'd put in the documentary had already come true by, by that point, so it just... I, I've been, I guess I've been on this for six, seven years now. I just wanna, what you just touched on today is- Mm-hmm

is actually now getting to where the crux of things 00:17:00 are. So, uh, uh, by the way, I, I don't mean to totally dominate this by coming into it, so if you want me to, to pause-

Matt Taibbi

No

Mike Benz

... or, okay.

Matt Taibbi

I, I, I, just I,

I think I just sent you by DM, um, look, I, I'm very anxious to talk to you in, in a, in a l- in a longer setting if that's possible.

I, I don't know if you know, but- W- w- we're launching a, a huge project, um, at my, at my site to kind of- Mm-hmm ... doc all the stuff, you know? Yeah Like, try to map out this whole world. And so y- y- you, you could probably be invaluable to us, um, you know, in, in, in, in, uh, as you say, downloading what, w- what you know and maybe giving us some directions to look at because this, you know, this world's kind of opaque to outsiders.

Mike Benz

Yeah.

Matt Taibbi

That's one of the things that I think is, is-

Mike Benz

Right. So-

Matt Taibbi

... interesting.

Mike Benz

Yeah. No, I honestly... So, uh, this sounds weird and, and I won't, I won't put too much of a point. I know I've already said it a few times, but, you know, I, uh, I don't 00:18:00 think there's a close second in the... Like, I, I don't think it's possible to have spent more hours a day on this exact thing that you're now, that, that you're, you're in than...

I, I literally, my wife calls it the man in the box because my whole life has, has just been listening to this whole network, uh, day and night, and chronicling and archiving and explaining. I've done about eight or nine congressional briefings to oversight Homeland Security, uh, uh, House, you know, House Judiciary, House, House and Senate, uh, Homeland, uh, E and C.

Uh, I've spoken to, uh, I don't know, four or five senators and a handful of c- I've, I've been doing... I, I... But you're someone who can actually communicate the story to a large platform. Uh, so I think that if, if we can talk in a longer setting, I can tell you literally everything. I mean, e- every single individual, every institution, the chronology, the pretexts that were used, um, you know, the, uh, all of, all of the 00:19:00 dirty little tricks that were done each step of the way, uh-

Matt Taibbi

Oh, that's great

Mike Benz

how, how it con- how it connects to both, you know, the policy and the technology. 'Cause y- 'cause it, the, the, the tech involved here is also a lot of how this is powered with AI, and the AI revolution that happened with, with what was, you know, natural language processing and the ability to actually be proactive with censorship rather than the pre-2016 reactive model, uh, that content moderation had.

So, uh, uh, if I can s- I, I sort of, if, if... I know we're gonna talk longer, you know, uh, in another setting, but for the benefit of people in the audience, um, I, I, I thought it might be useful for me to cover, uh, a little bit about how what, what you just dropped today, uh, uh, some, some of the backstory on it, but I can pause here- Yeah.

Matt Taibbi

No, no, no ... if there's something else I would, I would love to hear that, so yeah.

Host

Mm-hmm. Yeah. And Mike, uh, Matt, I appreciate both of you guys being here. Um, and I've got a ton of requests, but if this conversation can happen, because I've been going after 00:20:00 this stuff like crazy and I have two experts that are gonna talk about this, you guys have the floor by all means.

20:00Benz's 'linear story': New Knowledge, DiResta, Stamos, and the EIP

Mike Benz

Please. Okay. So before I start with the linear story, you know, you mentioned new knowledge. And, you know, and exactly what you said, I, about, about the incredible scandal of, of, uh, of New Knowledge's involvement, uh, you know, given the fact that they did a, you know, a, a, a, a i- in their exact words, "We," quote, "We orchestrated an elaborate false flag operation to portray Roy Moore as someone..."

That's a direct quote from their donor request, uh, yeah, uh, report that they did. But it's even worse than that. Uh, this is sort of where I entered the conversation, 'cause when I heard you say that, I mean, it's, it goes so much deeper. So, so New Knowledge, you know, you mentioned Jonathan Morgan and whatnot, but another New Knowledge employee was Renee DiResta.

Matt Taibbi

Yeah.

Mike Benz

Now, now Renee DiResta wasn't just, you know, uh, the, it, the top lieutenant under Alex Stamos at the Stanford Internet Observatory for as at, for EIP. 00:21:00 EIP, who was the deputized disinformation flagger for, um, for DHS. They had a formal partnership. They, you know, they had, they, they, uh, uh, starting June 23rd, 2020, and then formalized on dhs.gov, uh, using DHS's 24/7 cyber mission control, they converted it from a cybersecurity mission control, this is EI ISAC, to a cyber censorship mission control center, and they gave EIP special privilege access to have a m- to have a, uh, a content moderation escalase, uh, escalation pathway to every single, uh, social media company's, uh, content moderation teams.

And that was on par with DHS and FBI. So basically they deput- they gave this private group, EIP- Uh, DHS, FBI powers to talk directly to the, the, the key content moderation, uh, liaisons who are all set up initially with these 00:22:00 DHS partnerships to stop Russian... And then they did what I call the foreign to domestic switcheroo.

So, so what happened, so Renee DiResta is, was actually the keynote speaker at CISA in the September 2021, uh, uh, uh, CISA disinformation conference. She gave a, Matt, you have to watch this whole video. And, and it, it, she, this is about a 15, 20-minute keynote speech on disinformation. She, she's one, and she's for a long, I mean, she's literally, she's sort of like the CISA sherpa on, on, uh, on s- on censorship.

You know, and she's been at this a long time. She was doing it, you know, she's got a, quite a pedigree. But she was, but she was the technical director at New Knowledge. So in addition to her, she, not only was sh- uh, she involved on, on the angle that, that, that you're mentioning here, but she is a, she is essentially a government actor on this as well.

I mean, not 00:23:00 just doing an advisory thing with the Senate Intelligence Committee, but she's actually giving direction to DHS and to CISA, and she was deputized. They didn't just, it wasn't like she's just providing, you know, some advisory language in a, in a, uh, you know, in a sort of white paper style Senate report.

She was deputized as the top lieutenant at EIP to censor not just the 2020 election, and by the way, EIP censored 22 million tweets, okay?

Mike Benz

According to their own 292-page report, okay? But I have all this chronicled, by the way, my, um, on my, uh, my foundation's website. I've got all of this. I've got a 10,000-word report with about 25 insider confession videos from all these people that, that, Matt, once you see this you're- You're gonna gr- the superpowers I think this will give you with to be armed with this info is going to make everything start to make, make a lot of sense.

But basically, uh, with, with Renee DiResta, 00:24:00 it's, and, you know, EIP, so, so the, in their own 292 page they w- port- now again, they did this just like New Knowledge did because they need to brag about what they did because the competitive, the, the censorship industry is a competitive space. Everyone's competing for the same pool of donor funds and government grants.

So EIP actually got, her lab got $3 million from the Biden administration right after publishing their confession. Every single one of the EIP groups, the, the four, the four groups that DHS contracted out to censor the 2020 election and to censor COVID, uh, ended up getting millions of dollars from the federal government, uh, right after the 2020 election.

But so what happened is, is it was 22 million tweets that they labeled misinformation incidents between June 2020 and November 2020, just in that five-month span, and they did this for 15 platforms. So it was Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, TikTok. They even went to Reddit, Twitch. They, the, they 00:25:00 combed the entire internet.

In total, the sum damage was hundreds of millions of social media posts and content through a government deputized dhs.gov using taxpayer-funded infrastructure w- through EI ISAC to do it.

Matt Taibbi

Wow.

Mike Benz

I mean, this, this is a scale of censorship the world has never experienced before. This is something... Now I've been following this since the, you know, when, when Freedom House was publishing its, i- its papers on, on the China, uh, the China's great firewall.

There's a 2013 Freedom House report that goes through how, you know, China's internet censorship techniques. I went back recently and compared what, what we're doing to what we accuse China of doing. It's these orders of magnitude. I mean, there's... A- but and by the way, this, this whole DHS... See, that's what I'm saying.

The, and why, I wanna tell the whole story in a second, but just one last thing on this to complete the thumb- the, the thing of it 'cause I don't wanna make this a partisan thing. I don't consider myself a 00:26:00 partisan person even though I was a Republican political appointee both at the White House and the State Department.

But so, so I don't want to focus too much on, on just election censorship. The fact is, is COVID censorship worked the same way. They took this model that, that consolidated itself between the summer and fall of 2020, and EIP, the Election Integrity Partnership, run by Renee DiResta and, and Alex Stamos and Kate Starbird and the Atlantic Council and Graphika, uh, they...

EIP folded up after the 2020 election. They came back and they censored again with, with DHS for 20, uh, the 2022 midterms. But in the in between time, they, they renamed themselves The Virality Project. So they went from being EIP to being VP, and they did the exact same formula where they used what they called the whole of society model, which is four categories of institutions all working together.

You know, they said, they said, "Misinformation is a whole society challenge, and so 00:27:00 it requires a whole society solution." Which is a cute way of saying they onboarded every category of institution from the government to the private sector to the civil society to political like-mindeds in news media and fact-checking.

Those four categories, government, p- private sector, civil society, meaning, you know, universities, NGOs, activists, and then media, which is, you know, basically news media plus fact-checking. Those four categories of stakeholders began a long series of disinformation conferences, disinformation sort of, uh, best practices sharing, disinformation sort of policy formulation, and then they, they grafted that whole thing onto COVID and they used this ticketing system to do it.

I'm working with groups for FOIAs and lawsuits and potentially congressional subpoenas to obtain all those logs. I consider that to be the El Dorado, uh, you know, which is, which you've sort of opened the door and frankly, you've helped m- you've helped me a tremendous amount, uh, to be able to educate policymakers on this 00:28:00 because you...

The Twitter Files, the, the popularity of them and the accessibility of them has opened the door to get more transparency into the next level of them, which is what I'm trying to seek right now, which is this, there's this vast ticketing sys- You know, you, you put-

Host

Hey, Mike.

Mike Benz

Okay, I'll stop.

Host

Yeah? No, no, no.

You're good. You're good. Um, first of all, I am gonna be, like, glued to, to, to, to my phone until you, you and Matt work together to kind of clip this together, 'cause I'm, I'm, I'm so excited. 'Cause this is stuff I bang on about all the time, and Mike, you're an expert on a lot of things. I've t- been able to take a lot of what you've done and look at other things.

And while I have Matt and Mike both here, we're getting a ton of questions and a ton of requests. And guys, do you mind if we kind of field some questions because I know you guys' time is valuable?

Mike Benz

Sure.

Matt Taibbi

Yeah, yeah.

Host

Thanks, Matt. I appreciate you. Hey, Matt, you want to jump in?

29:00Interlude: a caller, and a Section 230 question

Questioner

Yeah, you want me to... Yeah, I j- I've, I've got Juanita Broaddrick who just called me because she was listening in on this space.

And, you know, she told me that, uh, you know, Matt Taibbi had reached out to her about Adam Schiff censoring her tweets, 00:29:00 and I'm just kind of curious if you could possibly go into detail on that. She said she didn't get clarity as to who authorized it or who ordered it, but, uh, she was kind of stunned that Adam Schiff was wanting her tweets censored, uh, Matt.

And, you know, Juanita Broaddrick's a great influencer and, uh, and, and a very good friend of mine, and just thought I'd ask that question on her behalf since she reached out to me just now.

Matt Taibbi

That's... oh, my goodness. I, I, y- I had forgotten, uh, about that. Um, I, I will look it up. It's, it's in there. Uh, but, you know, that, uh, uh, Schiff is one of the, um, he is one of the, uh, uh, people whose, whose name we kind of cru- we, we checked.

Actually, first we came across it a lot, and then, and then we decided to, to look at it again. Um, but I know there was a thing in there, uh, from his office. So I will, I will look it up right now and, um, and make sure that, uh, that I get that 00:30:00 out on, you know, even if I have to do like a mini Twitter file thread on it, I'll, I'll do it because, um, yeah, that, that, that was part of, uh...

If you give me a minute, I'll, I'll, I'll find it. It's in here.

Host

Um- Hey, thank you for that, Matt. I, I just wanted... You know, she was listening in and, and saw that I was in this space and wanted me to ask you a question. And, uh, thanks for all you do, first and foremost. Yeah, I don't think you hear that enough.

You're getting, uh, beat down by the, uh, by the legacy media- ... constantly, but we appreciate you, brother.

Matt Taibbi

No, thank, thank you. I appreciate it.

Host

Hey, Jason, uh, did you wanna, do, could get in here? Looks like you got a question as well.

Questioner

Yeah, not so much a question, but it, it's, it, I'm finally in a space with Matt, which is actually really good.

Uh, Matt, you were in a, in this space with, uh, Elon, the one that was, like, 100,000 people and so forth. And, uh, Tara Bull brought up, uh, to Elon about potentially supporting a constitutional challenge, and he said, "Yes, have them speak to Matt Taibbi. That constitutional challenge is mine." 00:31:00 Uh, the only problem is I have had no way to get in touch with you, so that was one of my reasons for, for jumping in here, is I, I do wanna talk.

But the reason being is we have two concurrent cases regarding Section 230. Um, I know a lot of people in this group know about some of them. But we have one in the, uh, that's a petition for the writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court right now, and the other is a full-blown constitutional challenge declaratory action, which would completely change the internet.

I mean, if either one of these cases is heard, it fixes the entire problem. And, and realistically, the reason, 'cause everybody's all over the place in terms of their interpretations of Section 230. The truth of it is, is that, what? Two and a half decades ago, they, the courts decided what the policy and purpose of Congress was rather than read the damn statute.

And our fix is real simple, is just read the statute, apply it as written, and we are now, we're currently working with Ted Cruz's office and Paxton's office. And believe it or not, the DOJ 00:32:00 in the Gonzalez case argued the same damn things we've been saying since day one. Basically, you know, it's, it's one of those, I, I do wanna connect with you because that it was something that, you know, Elon had said that he was interested in.

A- and also, Twitter's probably gonna wanna get ahead of a potential change 'cause if the Supreme Court hears our case, the internet's gonna change, like, drastically change.

Matt Taibbi

Right. Right. Um, yeah, I'm interested. I'm not, I'm not a lawyer. I don't know, I don't know what I can do. But, but, um, I'd be happy to, you know, try to help publicize it- Yeah

or, you know, if, if that's-

Questioner

If we could just, if you can shoot me a DM through Twitter, then I can actually respond to you, and we can talk off here, and I can explain what all is going on.

Matt Taibbi

Sure. That would- What's, what's your handle there?

Questioner

Uh, it's Jason Fyk. I'm on the thing there Okay. J-A-S-O-N F-Y-K. All right. And also, real quick- You're a difficult person to get a hold of.

Matt Taibbi

Well, no, I mean, I'm... Yeah, as you can imagine, it's, it's, um, it's been, uh, been crazy lately. But, yeah, um- Absolutely ... hang on.

Host

00:33:00 And F was and now is- Maybe we should meet DM. Like we don't have to do it on here ... is it... So- Awesome. Thank you, Jason. Um, I'm so excited- Thank you ... for everybody to be here. Thanks, Jason.

Matt Taibbi is here with us answering questions about his recent, uh, Twitter dump that dumped about two hours ago. Um, if you guys have questions for Matt or our panelists, please come up and request, but we are discussing the Twitter files. Um, Matt, I have a question. How much of Obama's, uh, fingerprints are on all of this, and how much of O- is Obama, you know, directing all of this per se?

34:00The GEC's origins and legal architecture

Matt Taibbi

I mean, I, and, uh, he, he obviously was the person who, um, signed GEC into law. Um, but when he did it, to be fair to, to Obama, this was when GEC was being envisioned for a very limited, um, uh, mission that was designed to deal with, uh, what one source called, um, the problem of, 00:34:00 uh, well off white kids from the burbs, uh, be- becoming ISIS recruits.

Uh, they basically just created a new inter-agency group to come up with a propaganda solution for that. Uh, it wasn't really though until, um, about six months later or seven months later after Trump got elected that, um, there was a pair of senators, Rob Portman and Chris Murphy, who, um- who, who got together and, and put GEC into the NDAA.

Uh, so now it had a budget. It's essentially part of, um, it's enshrined in law. Uh, it, it was going to get money from somewhere. It ended up coming mostly from DOD. Uh, so, you know, in terms of GEC, Obama, you know, yes, he's, he's the initial author of it. But, um, but you know, he, he didn't, uh, I don't know that he was the 00:35:00 prime driver of it.

Mike might know this better than me. But, but, um, but honestly, he... What, what happened with the, with the broader kind of anti-disinformation world, I think is more important, and that most of that took place after he left office.

Mike Benz

Right. So, so just to piggyback on that. So you know, GEC was set up at a ti- You know, so you had this...

W- when, when social media became... You know, the State Department's involvement in social media started with Jared Cohen in, in about 2007. Jared Cohen was, uh, i- is, is a figure who's, who now runs Google Jigsaw. He started off as a 24 or 26-year-old kid at the Office of Policy Coordination at the State Department, which is the, which is the linkage node between the State Department and the CIA.

And he got there in about 2000, 2007. You know, so you had fa- you had 00:36:00 Face- Facebook in 2004, YouTube in 2005, Twitter in 2006, smartphone in, in 2007. Uh, in 2007 when Jared Cohen gets there, uh, he looks around and as he's this young, young, young kid who was basically advising on, on, on how to, um, how to organize youth movements, uh, for purposes of regime change operations overseas.

And so he was helping at, at the OPC, he was helping the State Department and CIA formulate, uh, basically covert operations and, and, and forge statecraft, uh, initiatives around regime change and counterinsurgency, uh, for purposes of us managing the world empire He looked around and he saw everything was being done analog.

You know, at that point the State Department was still using CIA station houses and consulates and embassies. Everything was, was, was, it was analog. Nothing scaled digitally. He said, "Why are we running these operations, uh, uh, through the, through an analog 00:37:00 method when all of the people we want to organize if we, uh, for a color revolution or for a regime change, everyone's on Facebook.

Everyone's listening to things on YouTube. Everyone's talking on Twitter. Why are we running things through embassies when we could be running them through social media?" And so he helped carve under, uh, under the Bush administration, under Condoleezza Rice, a doctrine that came to be known as digital statecraft or Statecraft 2.0.

He, uh, this Republican appointee was considered so critical to, to the next evolution in American statecraft and intelligence operations that he was actually kept on by the Democrats. When Hillary Clinton... When, when Obama won in 2008, uh, and Hillary Clinton ran the State Department, she kept, she kept over this Bush-era holdover, and Jared Cohen became sort of like the cream, you know, the talk of the town, uh, from, from that period And then, uh, he, you know, he's vo- voted...

He was named one of the top 50 most powerful people in Washington at, like, 00:38:00 27 years old. Could have done anything, and he goes over at that point to what at the time was only a nu- number 120 by market cap in terms of corporations, and that was Google. Everyone thought, "What the hell is Jared Cohen doing with his career?"

But turned out that he was going to start this one-person incubator at Google, which was called, at the time, Google Ideas, it's now called Google Jigsaw, where, where it would have the non-profit mission of simply solving, uh, geopolitical problems, uh, that Google has proprietary resources on. What that was was the creation of essentially a shadow state department that would work in the private sector to help coordinate information operations of the State Department with, with those contacts.

It, but it never had a formal place that it resided within State. They couldn't have it, they couldn't have OP, they couldn't have the Office of Policy Coordination, right? That, that's the CIA. So, they cr- so, when, so when the Global Engagement Center got started, it was initially for as, as Matt said, you know, under the banner of 00:39:00 counter-ISIS, right?

Because at the time, Obama wanted to put boots on the ground in Syria, and there was a big sort of, you know, scare around homegrown ISIS threats. Um, and it, it was also, uh, you know, out of this sort of recognition of, of the power of so... Th- there was no s- s- uh, censorship office at State. You know, censorship was always something that was done on the covert side, you know, if the CIA was going to, say, shake down an editorial desk in Germany in order...

Or, or, you know, manipulate information environments, that wasn't something that was done overtly. But in order for something to scale, you know, y- you are going to need some sort of, of overt public-facing front. The Global Engagement Center was, was created for that purpose. And, and it was originally run by a guy named Rick Stengel.

Rick Stengel was the former managing editor of Time Magazine. He was a free speech absolutist, which, which is ironic after, after his evolution, because, uh, Rick Stengel He's a total, you know, dyed in the wool, you know, sort of Atlantic 00:40:00 Council, uh, uh, NATO, NATO fellow, uh, from that sort of traditional foreign p- uh, foreign policy establishment side.

And he was the Undersecretary of Public Affairs, so he ran propaganda. He, you know, he called him- he was a self-described propagandist in chief for the Obama administration. Uh, and then when Trump won the election in 2016, he about-faced everything. You know, it's funny because the Global Engagement Center folks testified on the Hill that, that their job was to, uh was to export the First Amendment abroad, which is ironic because Rick Stengel then wrote a book after Trump won and then published a Washington Post editorial calling for an end to the First Amendment because the First Amendment w- was no longer compatible with a social media age where it could result in people like Trump getting elected.

He called it a thr- a th- this is the guy who ran, this is, this is the founder of the Global Engagement Center. You know, Rick St- uh, you know, uh, the, its first di- director, whatever, Rick Stengel. Uh, and so, so this, so I, what 00:41:00 happened was is the Global Engagement Center became used at, the d- the Department of Defense has a limited amount of, of play with what it can actually do without laundering things through non-military channels.

The, so, so DOD had 120 milli- million scheduled, uh, that was allotted to it for fighting basically Russian influence in Eastern Europe, uh, after the Crimea annexation in, in, uh, in 2014. When Trump won in 2016, that 120 million was slotted from the Defense Department. It was transferred over to GEC because you have to understand even though, even though it was a, now a Republican administration, the, the sort of war hawk, uh, uh, and more tra- the sort of legacy establishment GOP foreign policy establishment side, uh, as well as the careers who were, who were predominantly Democrats totally owned the Global Engagement Center.

They wanted to set up CISA, which beca- which is now 00:42:00 DHS's permanent domestic censorship entity. They wanted that originally. It, it's funny, there's memos that they, that they, that they, uh, that they wrote in 2017 about how they could get a domestic censorship bureau into, uh, y- how to give it permanent authorization.

And they talk about, oh, you know, we could put it in the CIA, but we can't really scale it if we do it clandestine, plus it's foreign-facing. We would love to put it, we would love to have the Global Engagement Center do, uh, do domestic, uh, do domestic counter-misinformation, domestic censorship, but it's, it's foreign-facing.

Ah, we really can't do it there. We want to do the FBI, but the FBI has a domestic, has, uh, uh, is, uh, has a domestic jurisdiction, but it's unfortunately it's the investigative arm of the Justice Department. So we can use DHS to combine the foreign powers of the CIA with the domestic jurisdiction of the FBI without needing a law enforcement predicate, because DHS is the only other equity in, that is, that is in- intelligence and domestic-facing other than the FBI.

But the difference 00:43:00 is DHS doesn't require y- uh, law-breaking as a predicate. They could, FBI could do censorship on, on, on Russia-related stuff because they say, "No, it's counterintelligence," and so this is national security and counterintelligence. They can't do that for your tweets about COVID or, or mail-in ballots.

That was the beauty of what they created at CISA. CISA was modeled on what they were already doing with GEC. They took the GEC model and they, and they applied it domestically by say, by essentially creating a domestic CIA, which I should add is exactly how the Church Committee hearing started when the CIA was doing this in the '60s and '70s, and Ramparts Magazine busted them for basically having foreign intelligence powers applied against domestic political movements.

Um, I can talk way more about this. We'll pause here.

Host

Yeah, 100%,

Mike. And, um, a- and again, we, I've been kind of breaking down, uh, what the FMIC is, what, uh, was happening with Bill Evanina and the Office of Director of National Intelligence, and how they were coordinating, uh, creating CISA to create that censorship 00:44:00 apparatus.

Uh, and it's, oh, there's so much here, and I, I, I could speak hours about this, and I know you can 'cause you're more the expert than I am. Um, but real quick, while I've got you, Matt, two things. Number one, um, number one, I wanted to, I was hoping that... 'Cause I, I see a lot of comments still out there, like, "Why does Matt get access to all this?"

And, "Why are they pr- why are they gatekeeping, protecting?" You've explained before how you actually have to put in requests and take the information. I, real quick, I want, I was hoping to kind of clear it up for people who've never heard this before of how you actually get this information. And then Kieran is here, who is gonna kind of give us some background on what, why Hindu nationalists were mentioned in this as well.

So Matt, if you could, if you're here.

Okay, I believe Matt's probably back channeling, so here's what I'm gonna do-

Matt Taibbi

Oh, I'm here

Host

... Karen, you're staying-

Matt Taibbi

I'm here. I'm here. I'm sorry.

Host

Oh, hey, Matt.

45:00Funding and the 'whole-of-society' picture

Matt Taibbi

Okay. Uh, yeah. Okay. I had my, uh... I was muted. Um, so, uh, yeah, and I would just say, look, Twitter's a big corporation. 00:45:00 They've, they've got lawyers. They're concerned about all kinds of things.

So there's a little bit of a back and forth between, um, you know, the company and, uh, you know, people who are hired to make sure it doesn't have liability issues. It- it's, it goes against the instincts of every, every good lawyer to have a journalist, um, you know, rooting around in the private files of any company.

So the, you know, the way we do this though is, is fairly simple, and it, and it's fast enough that I feel confident in saying that, um, they, they can't be vetting too much. So basically what I do is I, I, I send them off a request, uh, for information. There's, there's different fields of the company that I can search.

That includes Slack, email, and a couple of other systems. 00:46:00 Um, I can search against people, uh, and other search terms, uh, cross-reference with those. And, um, you know, th- there's, there's a group that's offsite that, you know, uh, turns that information over as quickly as they can, and, and then I have to view it on site basically.

Uh, so it's, you know, it, it's, it's not a perfect process, but, uh, th- there are people who've criticized it, and the only thing I can say is every reported story involves information that you're being given by sources that is never w- you know, a 100% complete set of everything that they know. Um, so the, my only responsibility is, is to kinda decide or to try to figure out what's true and what isn't, and what's, what's a news story and what isn't, and then we go from there.

I, but I have strongly gotten the sense from the s- the start that they're, you know, 00:47:00 that they're trying, they're, they're doing this in, in the spirit of, um, kinda not getting in the way of the reporting process as opposed to trying to direct me, uh, in, in one, one r- way or another. Let's put it that way

Host

Right. And, and I, I wanted to clear that up because I, I, I frankly, I get frustrated with a lot of people that think they know what's going on. And I've actually spoken to you directly before. It was Tara and I's space that you came into, and when we were talking about this, and it's just, it's frustrating for me when I hear that.

I'm like, "Guys, this... You have to understand this process." And that's why I wanted you to ask the question. I really appreciate you laying that out for me. Um, if you guys don't mind, Matt, if you've got a couple minutes, stick around here. I'd love to field these questions. And again, I can't tell you how much I appreciate the work you're doing with the Twitter fire- files.

Fascinating, amazing stuff. And also wanted to commend you on your career. Um, as a journalist, you've always maintained the truth, and I think that's why you're involved here, and it's really, really important for people to know that. Thank you. So thank you. Um, yeah. Phenom, go ahead.

Questioner

Hey. 00:48:00 Excuse me. This is so great.

It's really fun to see, um, Mike and Matt on the same space. I'm really glad you guys can connect. My question, um, is that it's, you know, Twitter has definitely been a major issue here, but I'm even more concerned about Google because while Twitter, you know, limits what we can say, Google is where we look for what other people say or look for information directly from the source.

So Mike, you mentioned, you know, maybe subpoenas. Do you think that since we're in a situation here with Elon, who's willing to allow people like Matt, you know, look at the, the records that he has, we don't really have a situation like that with Google. Do you think that Congress will be able to subpoena enough information to really make a dent in what's happening with Google?

Mike Benz

Is that question for me or for Matt? Well- Sorry.

Questioner

Yeah, it's for you, Mike.

49:00What can be done — and closing

Mike Benz

Okay. Sure. Yeah. Well, so, you know, I've 00:49:00 now... My sense of it is that there actually is a lot of momentum, the likes that have not existed really ever to this point, uh, in Congress to actually, uh, seek that transparency. Now, the transparency is actually a much easier ask than legislation.

Uh, and I have, I've gotten encouraging feedback that those subpoenas, uh, are likely to be fired off. I sh- and I should say, by the way, uh, Jim Jordan's, uh, weaponization subcommittee actually did sub- send subpoenas to Google. I believe that f- for, uh, specifically for all of Google's communications with government, uh, representatives, employees or agents, uh, all written documents, all records, logs, emails, you know, all of that.

Uh, so that has been subpoenaed with a demanded response date, I believe, of March 23rd or thereabouts. So there, so the subpoena process... Now, that's from the Judiciary Committee. Um, there could be more 00:50:00 specific and, and ta- tailored ones from, from different committees. Um, but so that's already been fired off, and I should say that there were folks who thought that because, you know, Jim Jordan has received funding from Google previously, that, that he might not take that kind of, uh, potentially hostile action against Google, and I should say that he has impressed in pr- in, in moving forward with it.

Now, what they do with that, that information, uh, the extent of what's provided and whether there is aggressive follow-up is a separate matter altogether. Um, but there are, I believe, a number of ways to, to get at that, uh, if what comes back in late March is not satisfactory.

Host

Right on. Thanks, Mike. I appreciate you.

Got a couple more hands here. I want to get to Dustin while we have you guys up here. And, uh, Dustin, go ahead.

Questioner

Yeah, so, uh, uh, Mike actually kind of answered one of my first questions, which was whether or not the subpoenas were going out from the weaponization committee. 00:51:00 Um, but Matt, I... The, the information that you've been uncovering, um, is so frustrating to see.

Like, to see, like, this giant censorship apparatus. Um, I'm just curious, have you formulated any ideas about, like, what a possible solution would be? And h- how we go forward with all this information? Um, how, how we prevent, like, this kind of state level censorship from continuing to happen?

Matt Taibbi

Yeah, I mean, well, to, to start with, um, I think people need to understand what it is, right?

So y- uh, you know, when, when people read, oh, it's the Shorenstein Cent- uh, Harvard's Shorenstein Sta- Center for whatever, they don't, they don't have a negative association with that. Or if they read the Stanford Election Integrity Project or, you know, the, the, the, uh, Clemson Media Forensics Lab, they don't think of that as an organization that is 00:52:00 mass producing censorship requests.

They think of that as this analytic academic institution that is doing some kind of important work. Um, so I think step one is making sure that people understand, you know, what these groups do, um, and how it's different from academia or research. Uh, and also who's funding them. Uh, you know, we're, we're doing this project now where we're trying to identify everybody that GEC funds.

Uh, I think that will only scratch the surface of how many of these institutions there are. Mike can correct me on this. But, um, but, but I think that's important. And then, then after that, the next step is you have to go after the money. That's the only way to do this. And I, I don't think these ideas not only have popular support, I don't, I don't even think they have, um, significant, uh, plurality 00:53:00 support among the population in Western countries.

Uh, if they were properly explained. So, uh, y- that, that is why... So that's, we're trying to get the, the, the news media to, to deal with this subject because, um, people are just not informed about it. I, I feel like if they were, there'd be more outrage or there'd be more outrage among different kinds of people.

Mike Benz

Let's, let's put it that way. Uh, and that's when things can get done. Does that make sense? Yeah. And Matt, to that- Go ahead ... Matt, to that point, uh, just, just to put on your radar, my foundation has documented a $100 million, uh, from, uh, from about eight different federal agencies in total that are subsidizing the censorship industry.

Uh, here you mentioned, you know, what you're tracking with GEC. And by the way, if you, I can, I can give you a whole, you know, sort of, uh, a ro- you know, roadmap on, on, on the GEC funding because, you know, a lot of the GEC stuff is do- you know, it's sort of laundered the 00:54:00 same way they laundered the Steele dossier, right?

They'll go to like a, a, you know, the University of Cambridge or Oxford. They, you know, they'll sort of liter- launder through British disinfo labs and, and orgs, or British orgs, and then the British orgs will come back and do the domestic censorship, uh, just like with the Atlantic Council Digital Forensics Research Lab.

But, uh, but you know, I, I saw earlier, just because we're talking about government funding in sort of responsive to the question of what to do about it, you know, so- You know, a lot of these GEC grants are only a couple million dollars. Um, the National Science Foundation has a whole new program called the Convergence Accelerator Track F program.

This is something set up in the Trump administration in 2019 for h- for grand challenges in science, uh, around quantum technology and, and, you know, solving these grand challenges, uh, in science. And when the Biden administration took over, they took this, this, uh, this Convergence Accelerator program and they added a new track called Track F, which is for the science of censorship.00:55:00

They say that misinformation is a gran- grand scale... And it's $40 million that I've documented in government grants. And when you see the promo videos for this, I, I did two reports on this. I've got a third one coming out next week. Y- uh, Matt, if y- when you read this, I think you'll be able to do magic with it because, um, I mean, by the way, $40 million is the amount that Sam Bankman-Fried gave the Dem- you know, he was the second-biggest donor to the Democrat Party in the last election cycle at $40 million.

This is $40 million straight from the taxpayers, and it's basically a continuation of DARPA/DHS Science and Technology Division doing it. I mean, this, what they're, what they're creating are AI censorship computer science, uh, tools, uh, frameworks, digital dashboards for them to arm their civil society and tech platforms with in order to s- to censor more efficiently.

You know, they say 00:56:00 fast, comprehensive, and precise. Uh, a- and, and they're literally creating millions of databased people on the basis of whether or, o- they are misinformation tweeters, retweeters, followers, amplifiers. You know, this, you know, it's, it's like the sort of counterinsurgency, uh, population mapping that was done under the Petraeus model in, you know, under, under the, for, for counterinsurgency purposes in Afghanistan, except it's being done, y- you know, it's being done for misinformation domestically.

So it's s- very similar to what happened with the evolution of GEC, where you went from counterterrorism to counterpopulism Well, the same thing is actually happening now in the misinformation space, and they don't even need a terrorism, they don't even need an extremism predicate. You know, immediately after January 6th, it was a little bit easier for them to sort of contextualize misinformation as being sort of a proxy for domestic extremism.

But as the 00:57:00 political energy for that has ebbed, it's all the way down to just misinformation. If you're wrong... In fact, not just misinfor- Malinformation is actually the lion's share of what's ca- of what's, of what's censored, and I can talk about how they actually got that. But malinformation is information that's technically true, or that fact-checkers can't falsify.

And, uh, and, you know, over 99% of the, the 22 million tweets, for example, that EIP censored were in that malinformation category because they, anything about... Well, I can go into all that. But basically, what I'm saying is there's $40 million just from National Science Foundation. It, but you've got, you've also got the Pentagon.

The Pentagon is funding NewsGuard. The Pentagon is funding Graphika. The pe- uh, and, and a do- and a- about a dozen others. Graphika, which, which censored COVID starting in January 2020. A military contractor who's getting, who's getting money for misinformation fingerprinting to see what people are saying about COVID origins.

Yeah, I mean, this, uh, the DoD who, who, who ran point on Warp Speed is 00:58:00 literally c- you know, is contracting out a, a s- uh, their, the, the censorship of, of online dialogue domestically, the US military. And so, I mean, between, between the State Department, the Defense Department, uh, the, the National Science Foundation, uh, the FBI, and DHS, I mean, that right there is basically e- you know, every s- every single one because under their own model, whole of society, whole of government, it requires all of them to each find the thing they can do to contribute to the censorship industry so that it's robust and, and, and subsidized.

Matt Taibbi

Well, and Mike, we definitely have to talk. Um, I, so I've, I've already reached out to you on, uh, on DM, but please, if you could send me an email or, or a text or something, and let's talk.

Host

Yeah. Will do.

Matt Taibbi

Um, folks, I'm, I'm gonna have to, uh, bow out, uh, to go get, pick up my kids. But, um, but thanks so much for, for having me on.

Uh, uh, I really, I really appreciate, uh, the opportunity. And, um, Mike, definitely looking forward to talking.-

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Transcript prepared August 3, 2026. Page first published August 4, 2026. Last updated August 4, 2026.